ABSTRACT Driven by the increase of data traffic, a heterogeneous ultra-dense network (H-UDN) constitute one of the most promising techniques to support the 5G mobile system. Ultra-dense network (UDN) refers to the idea of densifying the cellular networks to reduce the distance between the access nodes and the user equipment (UE) to achieve the highest possible transmission rates and to enhance the quality of service (QoS). Despite these advantages, (H-UDN) introduces numerous challenges in terms of resource allocation. In this paper, we develop a joint power allocation and user association strategy in H-UDN using non-cooperative game theory. The proposed game is divided into two sub-games, the Backhaul Game is implemented between BS and RNs in the backhaul links and the Access Game is implemented between the BS/RNs and UEs in the access links. The leaders estimate the strategies of their followers to decide on their strategies. Therefore, our solution starts first by solving the users association in the access links to derive the optimal power strategies of the followers and then choosing their optimal power allocation strategies. Subsequently, the followers do the best response to the leaders' strategies. The simulation results show that our proposed algorithm can achieve the optimal power allocation and improve the performances of the system in term of throughput and UE rate compared to existing methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing growth of data service and demand for a better quality of service, the next generation of mobile communication technologies will have a great demand for data traffic and QoS expectation. In order to meet these required demands, Ultra Dense Network (UDN) is considered as a key technology for 5G communication, by solving the problem of blind spots, achieving the goal of load balancing, improving the capacity and the performances of the system and reducing the distance between UEs and their serving station [1] . However, UDNs can also cause interference problems and difficulty to guarantee high-rate and low-delay [2] . Relaying can be a solution to these problems where one of the interesting features of RNs is the wireless backhaul, as it provides a simple way for throughput/coverage improvement [3] .
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Eventually, the interference mitigation strategies, joint backhaul and access resource management and backhaul capacity bottleneck solutions for H-UDN have become significantly challenging for operators especially when scaling up the network. Thus, joint resource allocation for the backhaul and access links is an extremely difficult problem [4] - [8] . The Problem of resource allocation in 5G UDN has been widely studied, but there are still open questions when dealing with the interference, bottleneck and backhaul/access links problems for resource allocation in an ultra-dense network. In [9] , a hierarchical game based on the Stackelberg model with two sub-games is developed to address the resource allocation and bottleneck problems in heterogeneous relay networks. To provide fairness among users and alleviate the network backhaul load, the authors in [10] , jointly optimize the power allocation at sources, the receive and transmit beamformers at relays, and the size of the cooperating relays. Simulation results show that the solution outperforms many existing multi-relay selection schemes and achieves performance very close to that of the exhaustive search scheme. A novel distributed algorithm that jointly tackles the coupled problems of user association, and TDD resource allocation, under cross interference constraints has been developed in [11] . Using optimization theory. It has been proven that the algorithm converges to the global optimum. Simulation results reveal promising qualitative and quantitative results, in terms of both user and network performance improvement. In [1] , user association and power allocation in mm-Wave based UDNs is considered with load balance constraints, energy harvesting by base stations, user quality of service requirements, energy efficiency, and cross-tier interference limits. The results show that the load-balancing association and price control user association significantly improve the network utility and energy efficiency. Authors in [12] , propose a downlink power allocation scheme for UDN based on local information by investigating non-cooperative game problems with a penalty and proposing a distributed optimal power control algorithm. In [13] , the authors studied mean-field game framework for uplink power control in an ultra-dense millimeter wave network. The proposed mean-field game considers the time evolution of the mobile users orientations as well as the energy available in their batteries, under adaptive user association. The objective of each mobile user is then to find the optimal transmission power that maximizes its energy efficiency. Results have quantified the performance gains achieved when using the mean-field approach compared to the baseline in which the nodes transmit with maximum power. In [14] , new approaches for jointly optimizing small cells-UE association and power allocation have been proposed in the context of 60 GHz millimeter-wave ultradense networks. the proposed methods have been targeted on maximizing the system EE subject to the QoS requirements of each UE. The numerical results demonstrated the computational low-complexity and effectiveness of the proposed algorithms. In [28] , the authors analyze an in-band full-duplex access node that is serving mobile users while simultaneously connecting to a core network over a wireless backhaul link, utilizing the same frequency band for all communication tasks. The optimal transmit power allocation is solved for two reference scenarios: a purely half-duplex access node, and a relay-type full-duplex access node. The results indicate that a full-duplex capable access node is best suited for small cells.
The problem of joint resource allocation between backhaul and access links was addressed for dense small cell networks in [9] , [15] , [16] and for relaying systems in [17] - [19] proving that it's extremely difficult. However, most of these studies considered separately the resource allocation for the access and backhaul links and did not consider the throughput balance between the two links and the bottleneck problem and, have mainly focused on resource allocation of access or direct links since in cellular networks, BSs and RNs are subjected to different power constraints which can cause problem to power allocation especially for joint access and backhaul power allocation. This motivates us to address the joint power allocation for the backhaul and access links using non-cooperative game theory.
The main contributions of this paper are listed as follows:
• A power allocation based on non-cooperative game theory in a heterogeneous ultra-dense relay network is proposed in order to guarantee QoS requirements and throughput balance between the access and backhaul links while estimating the number of associated UEs.
• Formulation of the game: The game is divided into two sub-games, the backhaul game (BG) and the access game (AG). The players of the Backhaul Game are the leaders and the players of the Access Game are the followers. The Backhaul Game goes as follows; By estimating the user association in each station, the leader is able to estimate the possible optimal power allocation strategies of its followers in the BS-UEs or RN-UEs links. Then the leader chooses the optimal power allocation strategies for BS-RN links. The Access Game goes as follows; According to the leaders' strategies, the follower does the best response to its leader and the other followers.
• Extensive simulations are conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed method. Experiment results validate the effectiveness of our solution in terms of throughput balance between the two links and the required minimum rate.
Remains of this paper is organized as follows. We describe the system model and formulate the problem in Section II. Section III elaborates on the proposed resource-allocation scheme based on non cooperative game theory. Section IV presents simulation results to validate our model and evaluate the performance of our game. Finally, Section V concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. SYSTEM MODEL In Fig. 1 , we consider an orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) heterogeneous ultra-dense network with one base station (BS) and multiple amplify-and-forward relay nodes (DF-RN) forming a multi-hop relay network overlaid on one macro-cell. We focus on downlink power allocation and user association. We assume that each relay is serving a set of UEs randomly distributed in the cell.
Both BS and RNs use OFDM modulation mode and the entire resources block are assumed orthogonal to each other to reduce the mutual interference between sub-channels (i.e., inter-channel interference (ICI)) and each resource block experiences flat fading to eliminate inter-symbol interference (ISI). Note that RB pairing in two-hop links is not applied here. As backhaul and access links are time-division multiplexed, the duration of the transmission is divided into two phases. Backhaul links are active in phase 1, whereas access and direct links are active in phase 2. For simplicity we do not introduce the duration θ = {0, 1 } of the backhaul and access links where the end-to-end throughput can be given as
Our proposed power allocation algorithm is designed with the assumption of a fixed bandwidth allocation to each sub-channel for all links. In other words, the total bandwidth is divided into a set of resource block (RB) where one RB of a transmitter is assigned to at most one receiver in any link, and each UE can be assigned a fixed number of RB. Let there be one BS o, k = {1 . . . K } RNs and m = {1 . . . V t } UEs. Let V 0 be the set of UEs served by BS and V k the set of UEs served by RNs. We can write the channel bandwidth of the backhaul links, the direct links and the access links are respectively denoted as follows B ok , B om and B km .
We assume that one user can only be associated with one station, x km is used to indicate the association variable between relay station k and UE m and x om is used to indicate the association variable between BS o and UE m.
In this paper, we use the Friis transmission equation [27] to model the power gain of the different links. Let β ok , β 0m , β km be the power gain for the backhaul, direct and access links respectively expressed by: In Phase 2, for the access link, we assume that each UE obtains a full channel state information (CSI) regarding other access link with the same access point RN. The signal-tointerference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of UE from RN k is expressed by:
where P km is the transmission power of RN to UE m, β km is the channel power gain between UE and the serving station k, σ 2 the additional white Gaussian noise with distribution CN (0, σ 2 ). I k is the interference caused by other stations and other adjacent cells to the mth UE. Interference in the same cell is considered negligible based on the fact that RBs are not reused and that the RBs are allocated in different orthogonal channel. in Phase 2, for the direct link, we assume that each UE obtains a full channel state information (CSI) regarding other access link with the same access point BS. The signal-tointerference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) for UE from BS o is expressed by:
where P om is the transmission power of BS, β om is the channel power gain between the UE and BS. According to Shannon equation, the throughput of the backhaul, direct and access link is given by respectively:
where B ok , B om and B km are respectively the bandwidths of the backhaul, the direct and the access links.
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The objective of our work is to maximize the total rate of UEs while guarantying their minimum required QoS. The optimization problem is therefore composed of two parts: the first one is the maximum rate of UEs of the direct links and the second one is the maximum rate of UEs limited by either the backhaul links or the access links. Thus the objective function can be formulated as:
where C1 is the constraint that there are n i users being served by station i (either BS or RNs), C2 specify the range of n i , C3 guarantees that each user can be associated with only one station, C4 sets the minimum QoS requirement R req to the associated UE m in term of data rate, C5 guarantees that all allocated powers are positives and C6 states that the sum of transmission power of different links needs to satisfy the limitation on their maximum power transmission and x1 and x2 are the user association for the direct and access link respectively.
This problem does not have a polynomial solution. Thus we propose to use non cooperative game theory for different links to solve it iteratively.
III. NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY APPROACH
Most of the related works on resource allocation for relay networks does not consider explicitly the throughput balance between the backhaul and access links to improve the overall network throughput. Thus, we propose here a new formulation of our problem as a joint power allocation between the access and the backhaul links based on non cooperative game theory with two sub-games, a Backhaul Game implemented between the backhaul links (BS-RN) and an Access Game between the access links (BS/RN-UE). The players of the Backhaul Game are the leaders and those of the Access Game are the followers. In the Backhaul Game, the leaders estimate the strategies of its followers and then choose the optimal resource-allocation strategies for BS-RN links. Then, according to the strategies of the leaders, followers do the best responses to the leaders using the iteration method. In particular, player i (i ∈ {1, . . . , K } ) in the Access Game is the follower of player i (leader i) in the Backhaul Game.
A. THE GAME-THEORETIC FORMULATION
The framework of our proposed game is presented as follows; The players in BG are the leaders, they estimate the possible strategies of its followers and then choose the optimal power-allocation strategies for BS-RN links. The players in the AG are the followers. According to the strategies of the leaders, the followers chose the best responses to the leaders' decisions.
Let B = {1 . . . K } the set of players in the Backhaul Game; let S b be the set of power allocation strategies of player b and let U b be the utility/payoff function of player b.
The backhaul game denotes by 1 is defined by:
Let A = {0, 1, . . . K } the set of players in the Access Game; S a be the set of power allocation strategies of player a and let U a be the utility/payoff function of player a. if a = 0 then the access node is RN and if a = 0 then the access node is BS. As each player a has multiple associated UEs, we denote P a as a power allocation matrix. The access game 2 is defined as:
Let R b be the rate of player b in the Backhaul Game and R a be the rate of player a in the Access Game. If a = 0 then R a = m∈V o R om represent the sum of all downlink rates of UEs that are connected to the BS. If a = 0 then R a = m∈V k R km represents the total downlink rates of UEs that are connected to RN k. To improve clarity, we call player b in 1 leader b and player a in 2 follower a.
We can define the best response of follower a as [20] :
where P * b is the best strategy of power allocation of leader b and P −a represent the power-allocation strategies of the followers except follower a. Let the equilibrium
Similarly for the leader b, we define its best response as:
where P −b represent the power-allocation strategies of the leaders except leader b and P * a is the strategy at equilibrium of follower a based on the strategy of 1 . The equilibrium P * = (P * 1 , . . . P * b , . . . , P * K ) of 1 be:
Nash equilibrium is the most used solution to game theoretic problems. For our proposed game, we will use the pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Let R opt a and R opt b denote the maximum sum rate obtained by the optimal solution to Problem (1) for the access links and backhaul links respectively. Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: R opt a = R opt b needs to be satisfied in order to achieve the maximum throughput of the whole system where R opt a is the optimal rate of follower a and R opt b is the optimal rate of leader b.
Proof: If an arbitrary player violates one of the constraints in (2), then
This means that the strategy profiles that cannot satisfy (2) will never be the optimal solution to the backhaul game and the access game. In other words, the optimal solution to the Backhaul Game must satisfy all the constraints (2) in order to VOLUME 7, 2019 have the optimal solution for the Access Game and to achieve the maximum throughput for the whole system [21] .
According to lemma (1), R opt a = R opt b needs to be satisfied in order to achieve the maximum throughput. Thus, we define the utility function of player b in the Backhaul game as
).
The leaders b of the backhaul game change power-allocation strategies to maximize their payoff. U b is a convex function that converges to 1, when R opt a = R opt b , we obtain U b = 1, and leader b can get the maximum payoff. In our game, the definition of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium is given as follows.
Definition 1: The strategy profile P * b = BR(P * −b , P * a ) is said to be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game [20] , [21] if:
1) FEASIBILITY
We need to investigate the feasibility of the pure Nash equilibrium in case some of the power allocation strategies may not satisfy the constraints. The following theorem provides the required analysis.
, then the best response is feasible and the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of 1 is feasible.
Proof: We start the proof by assuming that P b ∈ S b is a pure strategy NE of our game which violates at least one of the stated constraints (6) . Assume that P * b is the best response of 1 while the strategy of the other users is P −b . Furthermore, we suppose that (P * b , P −b , P * a ) violates at least one of the stated constraints (6) [21] .
If 1] and assuming that ∀b ∈ B, P b > P * b then we can obtain:
Obviously, (7) contradicts the assumption that P * b is the best response of 1 for b ∈ B, therefore, the Nash equilibrium must be feasible.
2) EXISTENCE
the existence of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium is investigated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: when x am is determined and R opt a is fixed, the pure Nash Equilibrium exists for this game.
Proof: the expression of transmission power P ok is closed and bounded by P BS max therefore, the power-allocation strategy space of the Backhaul Game is a compact convex set [22] .
Furthermore, the utility function U b is a convex function of R b . In this given condition, R b is concave over P b . Thus U b is also concave in S b [22] . In addition, U b is obviously a continuous function, therefore, our game must have a pure Nash equilibrium point.
Similarly, We define the utility function of player a of the Access Game as the following:
B. BACKHAUL GAME SOLUTION
In the Backhaul Game, first, we need to estimate the optimal user association so that the leader considers the strategies of opponents and estimates the possible strategy of its followers. By estimating the best response of the follower, the leader will choose the strategy (the sub-game equilibrium P * b ) with which it can obtain the maximum payoff. Thus, for the followers to obtain their maximum rate, they will choose the strategies such as R a = max 
The Lagrangian function of the problem can be expressed as follows:
where
T are the Lagrange multipliers used to relax the coupled constraint and for a = 0, We have P am = P om and P max = P max BS and for a = 0 we have P am = P km and P max = P max RN . We use the Lagrangian dual decomposition method to solve the relaxed problem (6) in order to estimate the user association strategies. Thus, We divide problem (5) into two independent sub-problems [22] . The Lagrangian dual function can be written as:
The partial derivative of sub-problem (9) can be expressed as:
The maximum of {x am } is defined as:
Equation (17) helps UEs to determine which station a (BS or RN) is capable of delivering the best service.
We can obtain n a from the partial derivative of
where n a is used by the station a (BS or RN) to know how many UEs to associate with.
In the following, we use the subgardient method to update the Lagrange multipliers as follows [22] :
where δ 1 (t), δ 2 (t) and δ 3 (t) are the step size and t is the turn of iteration. By updating the Lagrange multipliers via (19)-(21), the dual problem (12) will achieve the global optimum. In other words, when the multipliers converge reaching a solution that satisfies the constraints (10) at the end of the execution of the whole algorithm, we have solved the optimization problem for the UEs association and removed the UEs that do not satisfy the minimum required rate. Therefore, by minimizing the dual D(µ, λ, ν), we will recover the optimal value max of equation (9). After estimating the UEs association, the second step is to find the strategies of the power allocation of the followers assuming that UE m associated with the access node a. 
The Partial derivative of (19) is given by:
At this stage, if the strategies of other players are determined, the interference I k can be considered as determined. Thus, after applying Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, we have ∂L ∂P am = 0. The optimal power allocation of player a in the access link for each m is expressed by:
where c m = β am I k +σ 2 and x + = max(x, 0). We update α a using the subgardient method as follows:
Until |α a (t +1)−α a (t)| < where δ 4 is the step size. Once α a converge, P * opt am is defined. Thus, it is possible to calculate the optimal estimated throughput of the access links as R opt a follows:
In summary, first, we assessed the optimal user association so that the leader can estimate the optimal power strategy of its follower. Based on these strategies, we need to consider the optimization of the backhaul links (BS-RN): (27) s.t.
The Lagrangian function is written as:
After applying Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, we have ∂L ∂P ok = 0, the optimal power allocation defined as:
where C k = β ok I k +σ 2 and η is the Lagrange multiplier obtained by P BS max − k P ok = 0. Thus, the optimal rate of the backhaul link of RN k is expressed as
Now we can summarize the backhaul game as follows, the UE can determine the station with the best service based on the judgment criterion in (17) then the leaders estimate the possible optimal throughput of the access links R opt a and then based on these strategies, the BS allocate the optimal power allocation to RN until reaching the Nash equilibrium where R opt b needs to be equal to the maximum throughput R opt a so that the allocated power of RN k P * b = P * ok } at the equilibrium can be obtained.
C. ACCESS GAME ALGORITHM
Having obtained the power allocation strategy of the leaders b at the equilibrium P * ok , follower a needs to choose the best responses to the strategies of the leader.
We can use an iteration method to solve the power optimization problem under the constraint R 
(32) where δ 5 is the step size and p is given by
We summarize the Access Game as follows, when R opt b is determined, the follower a does the best response to the leader b and the other followers. we allocate the power to follower a using (32) until it reaches convergence where the final strategy profile P * am is the equilibrium of 2 .
D. ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the implementation of our non-cooperative game theory solution to solve user association and power allocation. The proposed iterative Algorithm 1 will guarantee convergence by using the gradient method. In Algorithm 1, we perform the Backhaul Game and the Access Game in sequence. First, we suppose that the optimal solution to the problem (1) requires N max iterations to converge. All UEs at each iteration will receive the required number of associated UEs of all the stations by choosing one of the stations to associate with, which can guarantee their minimum required rates (17) . Then the leaders estimate the maximum rate R opt a (26) of the followers obtained by the optimal solution of (12) and then chooses the optimal power allocation strategies (where R opt b can be close or equal to R opt a and the sub-game equilibrium P * ok = P * b is obtained.
Algorithm 1 User Association and Power Allocation Using Non Cooperative Game Theory
Set the Lagrange multipliers µ a , λ a , ν m and user association x am to zero and α a , η to one In the Access Game, Each follower do the best response to its leader and the other followers. The sub-game equilibrium P * am = P * a of the Access game can be obtained in several iterations as the power is updated according to (32). Hence, the strategy profile (P * ok , P * am ) (∀K , ∀m) can be deemed as the final equilibrium of our game.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Our objective is to maximize the total rate of UEs in the cell while guaranteeing the QoS requirements, reducing the interference and solving the bottleneck and user association problem. In this section, we use simulation experiments to validate the effectiveness of the proposed power allocation and user association algorithm based on non-cooperative game theory. The metrics we use for performance evaluation include the allocated power and the throughput of the backhaul and access links respectively, compared to the hierarchical game [9] , [24] - [26] and the UE rate compared to the non-linear for the whole system.
A. SIMULATION SETTING
In Fig. 1 , we consider an ultra-dense network where all users are distributed within one macro-cell with ten fixed RNs. We consider that all the users have the same QoS requirements. The proposed joint power allocation and user association based on non-cooperative game theory (NC-Game) are compared to Hierarchical game theory (H-Game) for the resource allocation in cellular networks with relays for this we take the example of [9] , [24] - [26] . With a fixed number of assigned UE in each cell, in this proposed hierarchical game, a Backhaul Level Game (BLG) and an Access Level Game (ALG) are implemented in sequence. In the BLG, the water-filling algorithm is used to obtain the maximum throughput for the backhaul links. In the ALG, each follower updates its strategy until an NE is obtained. The main difference of H-Game and our game is that H-Game does not consider the impact of the access links when performing resource allocation for backhaul links or the impact of dynamic user association. We denote that we do not consider the UE position or location in both algorithms [29] , we only consider the distance between the station and the UE. Thus, the simulation parameters are based on the Third-Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) and listed in Table 1 . in the H-Game. This can be explained by the increase in the interference, the bottleneck of access links and the densifying nature of our network in one hand. On the other hand, all the stations use the maximum power in order to achieve the NE (Throughput balance between the access links and the backhaul links) related to the estimated strategies of the followers and estimated number of associated UEs for the RN-UEs links in the Backhaul Game. Therefore, the RNs in the cells use more transmitted power.
B. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In Fig. 3 the throughput is obtained by the power allocation of the backhaul game. In NC-Game the maximum throughput is achieved after having the estimated number of associated users and the estimated throughput of the RN-UEs links, however, in the H-Game the throughput is achieved after having only the estimated throughput of the RN-UEs links. We can see that the throughput of the NC-game is higher than the H-game the iteration method uses equation (32) to update the power as shown in Fig. 4 . In the NC-Game, the power allocation in the access links is the best response of the power allocation in the Backhaul Game, thus, we have the power consumption of each link depends on the associated UEs and the optimal rate of the backhaul Game. RN1 allocates an average of 23.58 dBm compared to 24.02 dBm in the HGame, RN5 allocates an average of 31.33 dBm compared to 24.35 dBm in the H-Game and RN10 allocates an average of 29.8 dBm compared to 24.14 dBm in the H-Game. Due to the bottleneck problem and in order to balance the throughput of the two sub-games to satisfy the Nash Equilibrium of the NC-Game and having a dynamic number of associated UEs, our game uses more power than the hierarchical game (H-game) which is understandable. Fig. 5 shows the throughput of the Access Game. We can see That there is a difference of between the Access Game and the Backhaul Game which means that the Nash Equilibrium of the proposed algorithm is satisfied and the throughput balance between the links is achieved, which is the purpose of our game. Moreover, the throughput of the Access Game satisfies the required QoS. Having the throughput of the direct link 16 the optimal station (either BS or RN) that provides the best services for them and the minimum required rate while balancing the links' throughput and maximizing the total rate of UEs. Compared to the H-Game, our proposed game provides better performance and higher throughput. Fig.6 shows the throughput of the Backhaul Game and the Access Game respectively. We can see that the Throughput of the access links is almost the same as the backhaul link compared to the H-game where we can see there is a difference between the two results in different stations. Thus, even though NC-Game consumes more power in the access Game than the H-Game, it provides better performance and higher throughput and achieves the objective of our work in terms of throughput balancing and data rate improving on one hand. On the other hand, in our approach, the UEs are associated dynamically based on the best station that provides the best service for them compared to the hierarchical game that fixes the number of assigned UEs in the cell and calculates their Throughput. Fig. 7 shows the UE rate of all the UEs in the system. We use non-linear programming to investigate the overall performance of the whole system compared to our approach that uses two staged games as a whole. We can see that it is difficult to maintain the minimum required rate for all the UEs and the throughput of the two hop links degrade from one to another. Thus, as the result of the overall system performance without considering the throughput balancing between the backhaul and the access links is lower than the NC-Game for some UEs and higher for others, proving that considering throughput balancing and solving the bottleneck problem gives a better rate to all the associated users in the cell while satisfying the minimum required rate.
We compared our proposed algorithm NC-Game to the Hierarchical game, the simulation results show that our approach gives better performance results and higher total rate for all the UEs while guaranteeing the minimum required rate. In addition, we compared NC-Game with non-linear programming in order to prove the effectiveness of our approach by having two sub-games compared with one game for the whole system.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered a joint user association and power allocation using non-cooperative game theory under QoS constraints in order to maximize the total rate of UEs in the cell of different links while reducing interference and guaranteeing QoS requirements. In order to achieve this objective we divided the problem into two sub-games, the first game is the Backhaul Game in which by estimating the optimal strategies for the followers, the leaders choose their optimal power allocation strategies and the second one is the Access Game where the followers do the best response to its leaders.
The simulation results show that our approach outperforms the Hierarchical game. The numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm by guaranteeing a dynamic UE association, a higher total rate for all the UEs and throughput balance between the access and backhaul links. For future works, we will study the energy efficiency and bandwidth allocation in a Heterogeneous ultra-dense network while including the UE location in the cell by dividing them into different groups according to their moving speeds. ZIED CHOUKAIR is currently a Full Professor with the Higher School Communication of Tunis (Sup'Com), University of Carthage. His research interests include 5G mobile communication, IP networks, mobile radio, multimedia communication, quality of service, radio access networks, cloud computing, probability, telecommunication computing, telecommunication traffic, 3G mobile communication, the Internet of Things, machine-tomachine communication, multi-access systems, resource allocation, synchronization, telecommunication services, long term evolution, computer network security, correlation theory, energy conservation, fuzzy set theory, graph theory, mobile communication, and multimedia systems.
